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Summary findings
Glass and Saggi construct an oligopoly model in which a  Diffusion of the superior technology benefits local
multinational firm has a technology superior to those of  firms at the expense of workers, whose wages suffer.
local firms in the host country. Workers employed by the  The host government might have an incentive to
multinational acquire knowledge of the superior  attract foreign direct investment even when technology
technology and can spread their knowledge to local firms  transfer will not result, because of the wage premium
by switching employers. The multinational chooses to  local employees of the multinational  firm earn.
pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring  Also, foreign direct investment with technology
away its workers if the local firms are sufficiently  transfer may reduce the total economic rent the host
disadvantaged or if there are enough local firms.  country earns.
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1  Introduction
Technology can be transferred across countries through many channels (such
as technology licensing,  joint ventures, and imports of capital goods), but for-
eign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most important.1 By encouraging
multinationals to  establish local production  facilities, developing countries
hope to generate technological transfer to  local firms.  Such transfers may
occur through a variety of channels: the presence of multinational firms may
facilitate imitation  (Glass and Saggi 1998a and 1998b) or have more general
contagion effects (see Findlay 1978).2
While product imitation has been extensively studied, the role of labor
movement as a channel of technology transfer across firms has been largely
neglected. This channel differs from others because technology moves across
firms through  the physical movement of workers who have been exposed
to the  technology.  The goal of this  paper is to  capture  the role of labor
movement as an endogenous mechanism of technology transfer and examine
the implications of this transfer for total economic rent earned by the host
country.
In our benchmark model, a source firm establishes production facilities
in a host  country, and the source firm then competes with  a host firm in
a common external market. 3 The host firm may gain access to the source
firm's superior technology by hiring workers away its workers. Anticipating
the possible raiding of its work force, the source firm may choose to pay a
wage premium to keep the host firm from gaining access to its technology.
The source firm weighs the cost of paying higher wages against the benefit
of limiting technology transfer to the host firm. Thus, our benchmark model
determines whether technology transfer will occur, given that  the source firm
'According to the  World  Investment Report,  1992,  transactions  between  parent firms
and their subsidiaries  in royalties  and license  fees  (mostly  receipts  for  the use  of trademarks,
processes,  techniques,  copyrights,  and patents) account  for over  80%  of international  tech-
nology  transactions.
2Glass and Saggi (1998b)  address the potential for dynamic benefits from FDI and
substitution between  channels  of international  technology  transfer. See Pack and Saggi
(1997) for further discussion  of the role multinationals  play in international  technology
diffusion.
3The host country  serves  as an export platform  for the multinational.  Many countries
encourage  multinationals  to invest in their economies,  especially  when a large share of
their output  is exported to the world market.MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  2
chooses to produce in the host country.
Next, we extend the model to allow  the source firm the possibility of locat-
ing in a more expensive location where physical separation protects against
the spread of its technology to its rivals. Three different types of equilibria
are possible in this general model: exporting, FDI with technology transfer,
and FDI with no technology transfer.  Both exporting and preventing tech-
nology transfer under FDI raise the source firm's costs relative to allowing
technology transfer under FDI. However, the wage premium required to pre-
vent technology transfer is crucially linked to the benefits of the technology
to the host firm, whereas the added cost under exporting is not.  Our model
isolates the circumstances under which a multinational chooses to pay a wage
premium  - or refrains  from FDI  - to preserve  its  technological  superiority.
The wage premium paid by the source firm decreases with the host firm's
productivity  disadvantage, so total  economic rent  in the  host economy is
higher under  technology transfer  (than  no transfer) when the  source firm
enjoys a relatively large productivity  advantage.  However, a  source firm
chooses to curb technology transfer precisely when it enjoys a sufficient pro-
ductivity advantage over the host finn. Hence, the goals of the host country
and the source firm commonly clash, leading to a motive for an active host
government policy.
Our model isolates circumstances under which FDI inducing policies, like
those witnessed in many developing and formerly communist countries, do
indeed raise economic rents in the host economy. Our model indicates that
total  economic rent can increase due to FDI even if technology transfer is
not  achieved:  to  prevent transfer,  the  source firm pays a  wage premium
that  benefits host workers. 4 Indeed, technology transfer is not  necessarily
optimal for the  host economy:  FDI by the  source firm lowers the  source
firm's marginal cost relative to  exporting and may hurt the host firm even
though  the  host firm also experiences a  decline in marginal cost  (due to
technology transfer).
In a simplistic model, FDI inducing policies would not  occur in the ab-
sence of technology transfer. FDI would lower the source firm's cost without
lowering  the host firm's cost. As a result, host firm profits would be harmed.
Here, the wage premiums paid to  prevent technology transfer provide an
4Glass and Saggi (1998c)  provide a related argument based on general equilibrium
effects  rather than attempts to limit technology  diffusion.MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  3
offsetting component of total  economic rent.
Evidence on labor movement from multinationals to  host firms is con-
sistent with our model.  Labor movement from multinationals to host firms
occurs predominantly in more developed countries, where multinationals do
not have as substantial  an advantage over host firms.  Gershenberg (1987)
finds evidence of only minor labor movement from multinationals to Kenyan
firms: only 16% of the job shifts involved movement from multinationals to
host firms.  Bloom (1992) finds substantial  technological transfer in South
Korea when production managers left multinationals to join host firms; Pack
(1997) notes similar findings for Taiwan.'
Evidence documenting that  multinationals pay higher wages than  host
firms is also consistent with  our model.  These wage differentials are usu-
ally larger in less developed countries, where multinationals are more advan-
taged relative to host firms. Using data from Mexico,  Venezuela,  and United
States, Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1995) show that  higher levels of FDI
are associated with higher wages in all three countries.  In the two devel-
oping countries, they find no evidence of higher wages paid by host firms.
Thus, multinationals pay higher wages than  host firms in these developing
countries.
While the potential  importance of technological transfer from multina-
tionals  is widely recognized, few rigorous models examine this  process of
technology transfer across firms. The main exception is Ethier and Markusen
(1996).6 Our paper differs from theirs in many key areas. First, we examine
the transfer of process (rather  than product) technology. Thus, even when
technology is not transferred to the host firm, the host firm can still produce
using an inferior technology. The source firm always faces competition: the
issue is the strength of competition.  We explore the implications of partial
technology transfer, where the host firm remains disadvantaged relative to
the multinational  even once it has raided the multinational's  work force. 7
Second, we achieve some intriguing implications of technology transfer for
total  economic rent earned by the host country. In Ethier  and Markusen's
5Considering  workers  that left multinationals  in the mid 1980s,  almost 50% of all en-
gineers and approximately 63% of all skilled workers left to join host firms.
6See also Dunning  (1981), Ethier  (1986), and Horstmann  and Markusen (1992) for the
choice of entry mode between exporting,  FDI, and licensing.
7This  partial  technology  transfer  stems  from  some  forgetting  by  workers  or  lack  of
perfect suitability  of the  technology for the host firm (limited absorptive capacity).MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  4
model, technology transfer is curtailed by a lump-sum payment to the local
partner, so technology transfer is prevented precisely when lack of technology
transfer is in the interest of the local partner.  In our model, however, the
workers are paid the premium to curtail technology transfer, so the benefit of
technology transfer to the local firm (or the local economy) need not exactly
equal the premium paid to the workers. Much of importance depends on this
divergence between the interests of the host workers and the host firm. We
discuss the implications of technology transfer for total economic  rent earned
by the host country and draw policy conclusions.
Taylor (1993) allows  firms to disguise their technology to limit technology
transfer through imitation.  Such strategies are important for product inno-
vations,  where  knowledge of the  technology  is embedded  in the  product  and
can be discovered  through reverse engineering. Here, the superior technology
takes the form of process innovation (lower cost of production), where knowl-
edge of the technology is embodied in the workers rather  than the product.
Thus, we share the desire to endogenize the degree of technology transfer,
but due to the different technology considered, the strategy used to control
technology transfer differs.
Our argument is related to the idea that  firms may take actions to raise
their rival's costs in Salop and Scheffman (1987). However,  in our model host
firms can escape the cost increase by choosing to employ uninformed workers
rather  than  raiding the multinational's  work force.  Our analysis adds an
active role for host firms in countering the cost increase. In the equilibrium
of our model, the costs of host firms are always less than or equal to the costs
they would face in the absence of the source firm.
Section 2 develops our basic model of technology transfer through labor
movement  across  firms.  Section  3  examines  the  implications  of this  model
for total  economic  rents  earned  by  the  host  country.  Section  4 extends  the
model to allow for the possibility of exporting and considers the implications
of exporting relative to FDI for host country rents. Section 5 uses the insights
delivered by the models to shed some light on policy issues. Section 6 extends
the model for the case of multiple host firms. Section 7 concludes.MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  5
2  A  Model  of Technology  Transfer
A source (S) firm and  a host  (H) firm produce a homogeneous good and
compete as Cournot oligopolists. All output is exported to the world market
where the demand function is given by p(Q), p' < 0 and p" < 0.  The source
firm has a superior technology for producing the good: to produce a unit of
output, it requires less labor than a host firm.
Each firm has constant returns  to scale production technology. Workers
employed by the source firm acquire knowledge  about its technology, which
can be partially  transferred to the host firm if they switch employers. To
produce one unit  of output,  the  source firm needs one unit  of labor  (by
normalization).  Any workers the multinational employs are exposed to its
technology.  Since we focus on whether the  multinational chooses to  pre-
vent the departure  of its workers to the host firm, we assume the exposure
of workers to technology is immediate and cannot be prevented. 8 Workers
are considered informed if they have knowledge of the superior technology
(through employment at the source firm) and uninformed otherwise. To pro-
duce one unit of output, the host firm needs 0 units of informed labor or 19
units of uninformed labor, where technology transfer enhances a host firm's
productivity  0 < e.  Define the relative labor requirement for the host firm
as F = e >1
Further assume technology transfer remains incomplete. Although having
worked for the source firm raises a worker's productivity when working for
the host firm, the source firm's superior technology is only partially transfer-
able. The worker remains more productive when employed by the source firm
than when employed by the host firm 0 >  1. The source firm maintains an
advantage because some aspects of its advantage (such as superior manage-
ment and organization) are located in its headquarters and thus unavailable
to the host firm.  Also, workers may forget some aspects of the technology
upon leaving the source firm.
Workers are identical except for whether they are initially employed by
the source firm. If not employed by this industry, all workers can earn a wage
equal to one (by normalization) elsewhere in the economy, as knowledge of
8Technology  transfer differs  from general training in several important ways. With
general training, the firm has a choice  whether or not to provide  the training.  Such
training also involves  costs, and replacing  trained workers  with untrained  workers  would
lower  productivity  at the firm.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  6
the source firm's superior technology is irrelevant in other industries. 9 Thus,
firms face a perfectly elastic supply of uninformed labor at the given host
wage.
Our basic model is broken into three stages. In the first stage, the source
firm chooses the wage it offers to  its workers.' 0 In the  second stage, the
host firm chooses the wage it offers the multinational's  workers (given the
wage offered by the multinational). In the third stage, the firms compete as
Cournot oligopolists and the game ends.
Our assumption regarding the timing of wage offers reflects the view that
the  multinational  should have a first-mover advantage when dealing with
its own workers relative to the host firm.  Second, we assume that  workers
arrive at the multinational, see its superior technology and instantaneously
gain the requisite knowledge that  increases their  productivity at  the host
firm. This assumption captures the idea that  the time required to observe
a new technology is extremely short  relative to  the length of time  during
which the multinational must protect its technological  advantage. These two
assumptions allow us to focus on the source firm's incentive to  curtail the
spread of knowledge  that  would strengthen its rivals.
2.1  Output  Stage
We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this model through backward
induction.  Consider the output stage.  Let the output  of firm i be given by
qi, where i = S, H, and let total output be Q = qH  + qs."  Each firm i picks
its quantity qi to maximize its profits
7ri =  [p(Q)  - ci] qi  (1)
given the quantity chosen by other firm. The standard first order conditions
for profit maximization equate marginal revenue and  marginal cost (given
9To the  extent  that  the  superior  technology is also useful  in other  industries,  host
welfare under technology transfer would be higher but the multinational's decision whether
to permit technology transfer would not be affected.
'0We do not permit more complicated wage structures  that  would permit  employees to
bond themselves to the multinational  by paying an up front fee that  would be sacrificed
if they leave the  multinational  to work for a local competitor.  Such wage structures  are
impeded by lack of access of workers to credit markets.
" 1 Subscripts  i E {H, S}  denote type of firm: host or source.MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  7
the output of the other firm)
3q  =P(Q) +  ±qP'(Q)  - ci = 0  (2)
The second order conditions are  82ir/8q2 =  2p'(Q) + qp I(Q)  <  0. The
equilibrium outputs  of the  firms solve the first order conditions (2).  The
marginal cost of each firm depends on whether technology transfer occurs.
2.2  Wages  and  Technology  Transfer
Consider the  wage decision of the host firm.  Denote the wage offered by
the source firm by ws.  Workers choose to  continue working for the source
firm unless the host  firm bids them  away by offering a  higher wage.  By
offering a wage arbitrarily above the source firm's wage, the host firm can
lure away workers from the source firm.  Given our assumptions regarding
the two types of workers and the nature  of the production technology, the
host firm's optimal response has a simple structure  of matching the source
firm's wage unless it exceeds the level such that uninformed workers become
a better  value.'2
Lemma  1  The host firm  matches the source  firm's  wage WH  =  ws + E for
informed workers if the source  firm's  wage is sufficiently low ws < r or offers
WH =  1 to uninformed workers if the source firm's  wage is sufficiently high
Ws  >r.
For any wage ws the source firm offers,  the host firm hires informed or un-
informed workers,  depending on which is the cheaper method of production.  13
When the host firm hires uninformed workers, it pays them the wage (nor-
malized to  one) earned in elsewhere in the economy, whereas when it hires
workers away from the  source firm, it must  beat  the  wage being paid by
the source firm.  Our assumptions regarding the perfectly elastic supply of
uniforrned workers and instantaneous  knowledge transfer to workers imply
that  if the host firm decides to match the wage of the source firm, it faces a
perfectly elastic supply of informed workers.' 4
'2Proofs are provided  in the Appendix.
'3By convention,  at ws = r _,  host firms  hire only uninformed  workers.
14In the absence of these assumptions, the analysis would be considerably more difficult
and would detract  from our main points without  adding any crucial features.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  8
Next consider the wage decision of the source firm.  Given Lemma 1,
the source firm can curtail labor movement by offering the wage Ws =  r.15
We analyze whether paying a wage premium to prevent technology transfer
raises the source firm's profits. Proposition 1 below indicates that the source
firm's decision depends crucially upon the extent that technology transfer to
the host firm is incomplete (the magnitude of 0).
In the no technology  transfer (N) equilibrium, the source firm's marginal
cost equals cs = r  > 1 and the host firm's marginal cost equals cH = (9 >  0.
In the  technology transfer (T)  equilibrium, the source firm's marginal cost
equals one cT =  1 and  the host firm's marginal cost equals c;  =  0.  We
denote each profit function 7r: by iri  (cs, c'H) to highlight the marginal cost of
each firm under each equilibrium j, j e {N, T}.16
As depicted in  Figure 1, both  4(1,0)  and  4(1'  =  ,  ) are strictly
increasing in 0: source firm profits are higher when technology transfer is
more partial in nature. 17 Second, at the lower boundary where 0 = 1, source
firm profits under technology transfer 7rT(j, 1) exceed source firm profits un-
der no technology transfer 7rN(0,  19). In a Cournot equilibrium where firms
have constant  marginal costs,  a uniform increase in the  cost  of all firms
lowers profits of each firm.  Finally, at  the upper boundary  where 0 =  e,
7rT(1,  E) = 7rN(1,  0):  both firms have the same marginal cost under technol-
ogy transfer and no technology transfer, so source firm profits do not depend
on whether technology transfer occurs.
" 5Any further increase  in wages  only increases  the source  firm's cost without affecting
the host firm's cost and hence  would  be counterproductive.
"6Superscripts  j  E  {N, T}  denote the type of equilibrium: FDI with no technology
transfer, or FDI with technology  transfer.
" 7Source  firm profits  under technology  transfer increase  in 8 due to the higher cost of
the host firm
8wT(1,  )  paqTH  q7  >  O
Also,  source  firm profits under no technology  transfer increase  in 0 due to the loser cost
of the source  firm
s5  (  , 8)  _  9H  +  '  ]  ,N  o>0.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  9
For both technology transfer or no technology transfer to occur for some
values of 0, there must be a source  firm threshold  Os where source firm profits
are the same under technology transfer and no technology transfer
irT(1,  OS)  =  (@,  e)  (3)
We are assured of at least one intersection between the two profit functions
(the existence of a  threshold Os where 1  <  Os <  8),  if the source firm
profit function under technology transfer (plotted against 9) meets the source
firm profit function under no technology transfer from below at the upper
boundary 0 = 0:
07r'  (1, 0)  07r  N(1,  E)  0(4
09o  09
We assume the above condition is satisfied so that  the source firm curtails
technology transfer for sufficiently  high values of 9.18
Proposition  1  If 0 > Os, the source firm offers the wage  wN  =  r  and the
no technology  transfer equilibrium occurs, whereas  for all 9 < Os, the source
firm offers the wage ws =  1 and the technology  transfer equilibrium  occurs." 9
The above result says that  the multinational curtails technology transfer
precisely when technology transfer to the local firm is highly incomplete (9
is large). When 0 is large, the multinational has to pay a small premium to
curtail turnover.  If 8  is large enough, this strategy is worthwhile. For the
case of linear demand, the source firm threshold is simply 0s = 2.20
'8Using  the first order conditions  (2) and noting  that  q5T =  qS  when 0 = e, condition
(4) is equivalent to
qTH  9qH  1
The above condition  requires that an increase  in 0 has a stronger positive  effect on the
host firm's output under the N equilibrium  than under the T equilibrium.  Equivalently,
an increase  in a firm's own  cost must have a larger negative  impact on its output than a
decrease  in its rival's cost.
19This  proposition  rules out multiple  intersections  of the two profit functions.
20We  require e,  >  so that there exists a range over  which  the source firm prefers  to
prevent technology  transfer.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  10
How does the host firm fare under the two equilibria? A host firm enjoys
higher profits in the technology transfer equilibrium than in the no technology
transfer equilibrium 7rH >  7r.  To see the logic of this result, suppose the
source  firm  pays  some  wage ws  and  the  host  firm  chooses  to  match  that
wage. We show in the Appendix that,  in such a situation, a host firm suffers
a bigger increase in  marginal cost than  the source firm for a  given wage
increase since technology transfer remains partial  0 >  1 and its profits are
strictly  decreasing in  ws,  regardless of its  magnitude.  Therefore,  a host
firm's profits are lower under the no technology transfer equilibrium than
the technology transfer equilibrium, as its profits decline in the wage paid by
the source firm.
Thus, a clear conflict emerges between the  interests of the source firm
and  the  host  firm:  the  source  firm  prefers  no  technology  transfer  when  its
advantage is substantial  (for 9  >  OS), while the host  firm always prefers
technology transfer. More surprising is that the interests of the (host) workers
fall in line with those of the source firm, not the host finn.
3  Technology  Transfer  and  Economic  Rents
Define total  economic rent  in equilibrium  j  as the host  firm's profits  and  any
wage premium 2l
W3 =- H + B 3 (5)
where the total  wage premium is
B=-  (u?s -1)  qS  (6)
Workers  can  gain  employment  at  the  market  wage of one  elsewhere  in  the
economy, so only wage premiums (wages greater than  one) enter into host
economic  rents.
No wage premium is paid in the technology transfer equilibrium BT  =  0,
while the wage premium is positive in the no technology transfer equilibrium
BN=v  (r - 1) qsN  > O. While the host firm suffers lower profits in the no
2 "All output is exported, so consumer  surplus effects are absent. Having some of the
good  were consumed  in the host country  would  affect  host welfare,  but not the decision  of
the source  firm over  whether to prevent technology  transfer.MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  11
technology transfer equilibrium, workers enjoy a wage premium.  Therefore,
from the viewpoint of the host economy, either equilibrium could dominate.
From Proposition  1, we know that  the technology transfer equilibrium
is obtained  whenever 0  <  Os while the no technology transfer equilibrium
is obtained whenever 0  >  Os. Since host firm profits decline with  9 under
technology transfer, total  economic rents earned by the host country under
the technology transfer equilibrium decrease with 9. However,  economic  rents
under  the no technology transfer  equilibrium are affected by 9 in  a more
interesting fashion.
dWN  drH  dBN
dO  dS  dO
The first term captures the decrease in host economic  rents due to a decrease
in the profits of the host firm, while the second term captures the effect on
the wage premium paid by the source firm. In the Appendix, we demonstrate
that  the total  effect is negative if 7i <  1, where 7  --  is the elasticity
of the source firm's optimal output with respect to the disadvantage of the
host firm.
Lemma  2  If 7 <  1, then the total wage premium BN paid by the source  firm
in the no technology  transfer equilibrium decreases and host economic rents
decline as the host firm's  disadvantage widens (9 increases).
On the  one hand,  an increase in 0  lowers the  wage premium that  the
source firm has to pay to curtail labor movement (direct wage effect), while
on the other hand a higher 0 also shifts market share in favor of the source
firm so that  its  output  increases, leading to  an increase in the total  wage
bill (indirect output  effect).  When 1  <  1, the direct wage loss dominates
the indirect gain from the increased output of the source firm. Assume that
q <  1, so a greater disadvantage of the host firm implies a lower wage bill
and lower host economic  rents.  Thus, host economic  rents decline under both
equilibria as 9 increases.
When the magnitude of potential technology transfer disappears 0 = E3,
the wage premium under the no technology transfer equilibrium equals zero
so host  economic rents just  equals the host firm's profits WN  =  . As
illustrated in Figure 2, since the host firm's profits under the two equilibria
are the same when 0 = E,  the host economy's rent is the same under the twoMULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  12
equilibria.  Suppose that  the two curves representing economic rents under
technology transfer and economic  rents under no technology transfer intersect
at some host rents threshold Ow: WT = WN for 0 = Ow and WVT  >  WN  iff
0 > Ow. For this threshold to exist, host rents under no technology transfer
must  exceed  host  rents  under  technology  transfer  WN  >  WU  at  the  lower
boundary 0 =  1.22
Viewing the effects of technology transfer on source firm profits and host
economic rents indicates the potential for the objectives of the host country
and  the source firm to  clash.  This clash is likely because the source firm
prefers the no technology transfer equilibrium whenever 0 is large, which is
when host economic rents increase due to technology transfer.
Proposition  2  If  Os =  Ow, the source firm  prevents technology transfer
precisely when host economic rents are higher with technology  transfer.  If
Os  0 Ow and 0 <  min{  Os,  Ow}, technology transfer from the source firm
lowers host economic rents whereas when 0 > max{Os, Ow}, preventing tech-
nology transfer lowers host economic rents. Lastly, when max{Os, Ow} > 0 >
min{Os, Ow}, the source firm  allows (or disallows) technology transfer only
when host economic rents are higher (or lower) under the technology  transfer
equilibrium.
The relative position of Ow and  Os is key:  the further apart  they are,
the smaller is the  chance for conflict between the objectives of the source
firm and  the  objectives of the  host country.  In general, the  smaller the
divergence between these two threshold values, the bigger the range where
the two interests clash.
4  Choice  of Entry  Mode
Our basic model analyzes a situation  where the source firm has already lo-
cated its production facilities in the host country. We extend our basic model
by adding a preliminary stage in which the source firm chooses  between locat-
ing its production facilities in the host country or some alternative location
22This property need not always  hold, but does if e  is sufficiently  large, to generate a
sufficiently  large wage  premium.  We focus on this scenario,  as it allows  the richest set of
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(such as the source country or some third  country).23 The alternative loca-
tion should be thought of as the best (lowest cost) alternative location. The
rest of the model is as described earlier.
If the  source firm chooses to  produce in  the  alternative  location,  its
marginal cost is the wE.  The possibility of technology transfer to the host
firm is eliminated when producing in the alternative market.  International
labor mobility ensures that  host firms cannot hire away the  source firm's
workers in other countries. 24 We call the choice of producing in an alterna-
tive location exporting, although the source firm is in fact exporting to the
world market from whatever location it chooses (including the host country).
When making its decision between exporting and FDI, the source firm
looks ahead and realizes that  its own cost of production under FDI, as well
as the cost of its rivals, depends upon whether or not it will find preventing
technology transfer attractive.  The source firm's problem of regime choice is
summarized below: 25
T.able  1: Marginal  Costs  under  Different  Regimes
Regime  Source firm's cost  Host firm's cost
Exporting  WS
FDI with no technology transfer  r  E
FDI with technology transfer  1  0
To derive the source firm's optimal decision, we first define the change
in  profits  AIr7Ck =  7ri  - 1rik, where i  E  {H, S}  refers to  firms and  j, k  e
{E, N, T}  refers to equilibrium regimes. Consider first the derivation of the
locus  /Ait\,N  =-  -5E  - 1r5  =  0,  along which the  source firm is indifferent
between exporting and FDI with no technology transfer.  Since under both
regimes the host firm's marginal cost equals 19, the source firm prefers FDI
with no technology transfer over exporting iff w  >  E  . In (9, w ) space, the
equation w  = r-  traces a downward sloping curve:  above the curve
the source firm prefers FDI with no technology transfer and below the curve
exporting.
23A Japanese firm selling to the world market could export from Japan,  where it does
not fear technology transfer, or produce in China and  export from there.
24For simplicity, the source firm is assumed to be the lone firm from this product market
producing in the alternative  location.
25Recall,  e  > a > 1, r = e > 1 and WE > 1.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  14
Next consider the derivation of the locus ATrSET  =7dr -4  along which the
source firm is indifferent  between exporting and FDI with technology transfer.
Above the curve, the source firm prefers FDI with technology transfer while
below  the curve exports. By the property that  4rT  >  4rN  iff 9 c  s, the
locus ArSEN must lie above A1rF  over the range 0 < Os, with the positions
reversed once the source firm threshold Os is crossed.
Finally, consider the derivation of the locus A4N  r-47r  along which
the source firm is indifferent between FDI with technology transfer and FDI
with no technology transfer. Proposition 1 indicates that  /74 N  is a vertical
line at  0  =  Os in the  (9, w')  space.  To the left  of this  line, the  source
firm prefers FDI with technology transfer, while to the  right FDI  with no
technology transfer. Since neither equilibrium being compared is exporting,
the difference in profits is independent of the export cost.
Lemma  3  In (9, wl)  space, the locust of AI7rT  =  0 is downward sloping
and intersects the vertical axis below the locust of Air/N  =  0.  The locust
A7r'N  = 0 is a vertical line at 0 = 0s.  These loci all intersect each other at
(Os,  iv-)  and (1, 0)  where  s5E-e
In Figure 3, the SET  curve plots the locust of A7rsT = 0, the SEN curve
plots the locust of Ai7rN  = 0, and the STN curve plots the locus of A47TN =
0.26  When 8 > Os (to the right of STN),  FDI with no technology transfer
dominates FDI  with technology transfer.  Thus, below the SEN  curve the
source firm opts for exporting as a method of preventing technology transfer,
whereas above the curve it opts for paying a wage premium under FDI. When
O < Os (to the left of STN),  FDI with technology transfer dominates FDI
with no technology transfer.  Thus, below the SET  curve, the source firm
opts for exporting whereas above the curve it opts for FDI with technology
transfer.  Thus  the SET,  SEN  and  STN  curves divide the (,  wsE) space
into three regions: exporting (when wl  is low), FDI with technology transfer
(when w'  is high and 0 is low), and FDI with no technology transfer (when
Wu iS high and 0 is high).
26SET is darkened over a E [1,  0S) and  dashed over 0 e [es,  @]  while SEN  is dashed
over 6 e  [1,  is)  and darkened over 0 E [Ws,  8] to emphasize  only the boundaries of the
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Proposition  3  If 0 > Os, the source  firm exports iffw E < ror  else engages
in FDI and prevents technology  transfer.  When 9 < Os the source  firm exports
if  ws' < Q or else engages in FDI and allows technology transfer.
The maximum exporting cost Q (such that  exporting dominates FDI with
technology transfer) is defined as a function of 9 by 27
7rs(  = 7rTS  (1,  )  _+/irSET  =0  (8)
Thus far we have identified parameter values that  support exporting, FDI
with no technology transfer, and FDI with technology transfer as equilibria
based on the choice of the source firm. How does total  economic  rent in the
host country depend upon the regime chosen by the source firm?
The preceding analysis indicates that  the host economy is deprived of
technology transfer  either  if the source firm chooses to  export  or pays a
sufficient wage premium.  Is the host economy therefore indifferent between
exporting and  FDI  with  no  technology transfer?  Does the  host  country
always prefer FDI with technology transfer over FDI without it?
4.1  Exporting  versus  FDI  with  No  Technology  Trans-
fer
Suppose w5 = F and 0 > Os so that the source firm is just indifferent  between
exporting and FDI with no technology transfer (any point on the SEN curve
to the right of the STN  curve in Figure 3).  In either case, the source firm
will have cost wsE  =  r while the host firm will have cost e. However,  since
FDI with  no technology transfer  involves a  positive wage premium,  host
economic rents  are strictly  higher under FDI  with no technology transfer
than under exporting.  The interests of the host workers tip the balance in
favor of FDI (with no technology transfer) over exporting. This result obtains
even though the technology transfer, for which FDI is frequently sought by
developing countries, is absent.
27Since  the RHS is increasing  in 0, the LHS  must also  be increasing  in 0, which  implies
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4.2  Exporting  versus  FDI  with  Technology  Transfer
Next consider a comparison of exporting with FDI under technology transfer.
This comparison is of substantial interest for its policy implications. Under
both  regimes, the source firm pays no wage premium.  Thus, the only con-
sideration is the fate of the host firm.  Does FDI with technology transfer
always dominate exporting in terms of host economic  rents? Not necessarily.
In fact, the source firm may opt for FDI with technology transfer when
host economic  rents would be higher under exporting. Recall that the source
firm prefers FDI with technology transfer to exporting above the SET  curve
in Figure 3. To examine host economic  rents, we construct the WET  curve
which gives the locust of AW-`  T  =  WE'-1WT  =  o  0 in the (0,  w')
plane.  Using arguments very similar to  those used in the proof of Lemma
2, the WET  curve meets the VVEN curve at (E, 1), and the vertical inter-
cept of the  WET  curve is bigger than the vertical intercept of the 'WEN
curve, as depicted in Figure 4. Figure 5 plots both  the WET  and the SET
curves. Above the WET  curve, the source firm chooses FDI with technology
transfer but host economic rents are highest under exporting. In this (T,E)
region, FDI with technology  transfer actually lowers host economic rents rel-
ative to exporting. 25 Since ws  is high in this region, the source firm enjoys
a substantial  decline in its  marginal cost if it switches from exporting to
FDI, thereby adversely affecting the host firm's profits, despite the host firm
enjoying  technology  transfer.
5  Policy  Analysis
In developing countries, policies toward FDI have recently show a remarkable
reversal: many countries that previously actively discouraged multinationals,
now court them quite eagerly. This shift in policy is reflected in the explosion
in the  number of bilateral  investment treaties  that  have been negotiated
recently (United Nations, 1997).
While many elements could contribute to  explaining why a developing
country might be interested in attracting  FDI, technology transfer is one of
the dominant considerations, with higher wages another.  Our model suggests
28For each  region  in Figure  5, the first letter is the source  firm's chosen  entry mode, and
the second  letter is the host country's preferred  entry mode.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  17
that  the  growing attractiveness  of FDI  is a natural  consequence of trade
liberalization (wE falling) and greater absorptive capacity (9 falling).
5.1  Inducing  FDI  with  No  Technology  Transfer  from
Exporting
Suppose the parameter values are such that the source firm opts for export-
ing.  Additionally, suppose 9 > Os so that,  if the source firm were to engage
in FDI, it would not allow technology transfer. Would the host country want
to induce FDI by the source firm? Even in this situation, the host country's
economic  rents can be increased by inducing FDI. From Proposition 3, when
Ws=  r,  an arbitrarily small payment (either through a subsidy or a fixed
up front payment) to the source firm on the condition that  it produces in the
host economy will increase economic rents.
The first rationale for attracting  FDI suggested by our model is that the
source firm increases wages for host workers. In general, when w  < r, the
minimum specific  FDI inducing subsidy paid to the firm if it does FDI equals
_=  r - wl.  Under this subsidy, the profits of the host firm under FDI
equal its profits under exporting. Similarly, the source firm has equal profits
under the two regimes. Host workers, however, gain the amount (r  - 1)qsN.
Total subsidy payments equal (r - wf)qN.  Thus, such a policy of inducing
FDI increases economic rents  because wE  >  1.  The logic of this  result is
simple. Although the source firm is unwilling to undertake FDI if it has to
pay the entire wage premium itself, it is quite willing to undertake FDI if it
receives  a  subsidy  from the  host  government.  Host  economic  rents  increase
because some part of the source firm's cost savings from FDI are transferred
over to host workers as higher wages.
5.2  Inducing  FDI  with  Technology  Transfer  from  Ex-
porting
Again,  suppose  the  parameter  values  are such  that  the  source  firm  opts  for
exporting.  But  now suppose  0 < Os so that,  if the source firm were to engage
in FDI, it would allow  technology transfer. Now would the host country want
to induce FDI by the source firm? In this situation too there exists a potential
rationale for attracting  FDI: the host firm enjoys technology transfer fromMULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  18
the source firm.  To attract  FDI, the host government can induce FDI by
compensating the source firm for the loss in profits that FDI entails relative to
exporting. 29 Under what circumstances does such a policy improve economic
rents? 30
Suppose the parameters  lie exactly on the  SET curve and  to  the left
of the STN  curve (9 <  Os)  in Figure  3.  Here the source firm is exactly
indifferent between exporting and FDI with technology transfer, but the host
country strictly prefers FDI with technology transfer (WET  lies above SET
in Figure 5).  Again, a small incentive to FDI can yield an improvement in
host economic rents, net of the subsidy payment.  Here, the increase in host
economic rents results from higher profits of the host firm.
5.3  Policy  Contrast
While our model supports policies that  encourage FDI, for some parameters
discouraging FDI may be desirable for the host country.  If both  ws  and
0 are high, as may be for countries at low levels of development, the host
government may try to discourage FDI; whereas if both ws and 9 are low, as
may be for countries at high levels of development, the host government may
try  to encourage FDI. A shift in policy toward encouraging FDI may occur
as a country develops due to reductions in 0: the potential for technology
transfer becomes less partial in nature due to enhanced absorptive capacity. 3 '
The upper range of 0 represents the lesser developed countries that  host
FDI from developed countries: their host firms are substantially disadvan-
taged relative to multinationals.  In this upper range, multinationals under-
take FDI  but  prevent technology transfer from occurring, while host gov-
ernments want  technology transfer  (or exports) to  occur.  For the  highest
levels of 0, where host firms would gain little from technology transfer if it
were to occur (because it would be very partial in nature), benevolent gov-
ernments may adopt policies prohibiting, or at least discouraging, FDI. A
bit below that,  host governments may take a more positive view of FDI, but
conditional on multinationals generating technology transfer for host firms.
29This compensation could be done either by a flat payment  upfront  or by paying an
output  subsidy.
30Under FDI  the  source firm too enjoys a lower cost of production  and  the  host firm
could be worse off despite technology transfer.
31See also Glass and  Saggi (1998a).MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  19
Since the multinationals still favor FDI with no technology transfer, conflict
between the multinational and the host government remains.
In the middle range of 9, a host country may experience bLissful  harmony
with source firms, as both  desire FDI  with technology transfer.  However,
discord returns  over the lowest ranges of 8, which likely represent pairings
of developed countries hosting FDI from other developed countries (the bulk
of FDI).  Here, source firms choose to export as a cheap way of protecting
their technological advantage; however, the host country prefers FDI  (with
technology transfer initially and without as 9 approaches 1). In this range,
policies to encourage FDI may arise.
6  Multiple  Host  Firms
How do  our  results  change  if the  number  of host  firms  is given  by  n  - 1,
n  >  2?  As in the basic model, assume that  all host firms simultaneously
choose the wage they offer to the informed workers, given the wage set by
the source firm. Since all host firms are symmetric, we will restrict attention
to a symmetric equilibrium.
A host firm's decision of whether or not to match the wage of the multi-
national is independent of the wage offered by other host firms. The point
is that, given the marginal cost of production of its rivals, it is always in the
interest of a host firm to minimize its own cost. 32 Thus, Lemma 1 applies to
any host firm, regardless of the wage offered  by all other firms. Consequently,
given the wage of the source firm, either all host firms match its wage or none
of them does.
To ease exposition, let the  demand function be  given by p  =  A - Q.
Suppose  the  source  firm offers a wage w =  1. FRom  Lemma  1 it follows that
all  local  firms  match  this  wage,  and  given  our  assumptions  of a  perfectly
elastic supply of uninformed workers coupled with instantaneous learning by
workers, host firms face a perfectly elastic supply of informed workers. In
such a situation, market competition at the next stage occurs between n - 1
local firms whose marginal cost equals 0 and the source firm whose marginal
32Unlike  the source  firm, a host firm is incapable  of affecting  the decisions  of other host
firms  since  these are made simultaneously  and because  the informed  workers  are provided
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cost equals 1. Source profits under technology transfer equal
T  [A-n+(n-  1)0] 2
7rs  n  L  + 1  J9
Now consider the scenario where the source firm pays the wage r  and prevents
technology transfer. Source profits under no technology transfer equal
N=  [A-nr+(n-1)E])  (10)
The source firm chooses to prevent technology transfer if 0 exceeds a new
threshold
rSN >  T  iff  0  >  n-(
Now, the threshold depends on the number of firms (or number of host firms).
Proposition  4  For the case of linear demand, the source firm threshold is
Os-_nl,  where n  is  the  total  number  of firms,  with  n  - 1 host  firms  and
one source multinational.
When n becomes very large, the source firm always prefers to restrict
technology  transfer.
lim Os  1  (12)
n  oo 
With many local competitors, the benefit of restricting technology transfer
is large  since  the  source  firm  can  increase  the  costs  of all  local competitors
by paying a wage premium.
Regarding economic rents, we find that  the host economy values technol-
ogy transfer even more when multiple local firms compete with the source
firm. If the number of host firms is large enough,
n>  (  f  WT  >WN  (13)
then  technology transfer is strictly  preferred to  no technology transfer in
terms of host economic rents.  As the number of host firms increases, tech-
nology transfer becomes more valuable since it lowers the costs of all host
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7  Conclusion
We have examined  a market where a source  firm possesses  a superior  tech-
nology  relative to the host firm. If the source  firm opts for FDI, technology
may diffuse  to the host firm as workers  learn about the superior  technology
and thus become  more  productive  if employed  by the host firm. However,  the
source  firm  may be able  to increase  its profits  by raising  the wage  it pays its
workers  sufficiently  to discourage  the host firm from hiring away  some  of its
workers.  Such  a wage  premium  can raise profits  by preventing  the reduction
in profits  that would  occur from the host firm hiring  away  workers  informed
with the new technology  and thus becoming  a tougher rival.
Our model  implies  that there could  be two possible  rationale  for attract-
ing FDI: technology  transfer which  increases  firm  profits or wage  premiums
that benefit workers.  Since  the two never  occur  together, an important con-
clusion  is that developing  countries  cannot hope for both. One the positive
side, countries  are guaranteed  of one if they can attract FDI. However,  the
realization  of one  of these  benefits  is insufficient  to make  FDI more  attractive
relative  to exporting.  Nevertheless,  the host country can increase  total rents
earned  by making  the source  firm  switch  to FDI through policy  intervention
(for some  parameter values).MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  22
A  Appendix
A.1  Proof  of Lemma  1
Suppose the source firm offers a wage ws.  If the host firm offers the same
wage, it can hire informed workers (technology transfer) or else it can offer
the wage 1 and hire only uninformed workers.  Under technology transfer
its own marginal cost of production equals wsO whereas that  of the source
firm equals ws.  Under no technology transfer, the  costs of the two firms
are ws and 8  respectively. The host firm matches the source firm's wage iff
IrH(ws,  wsO)  >  g  (wS, e).  Note  that  7rT(wS,  8)  is strictly  increasing  in  wS
and  that  when  ws  = r,  r(ws,  wSO) = ?rH(ws, e).  Furthermore,  at  ws  = 1,
7H(Ws,  WSO) >  r(WS,  8).  We only need to show that there exists no ws # r
such that  7rT(ws,  w0 1) =  irN(ws,  8).  First  consider ws =  r-x,  x > 0. Then,
at ws = r-x,  7rT(wS,wsO) >irN(ws,E).  Lastly, at ws = r+x,  x  > O,
-7rH(WS,wsE)  <  r(wS,  8).  Thus,  the unique intersection of 1rH-(WS,  wsO)
and  rN  (WS,  8) occurs  at  ws  =  r;  for all wS < r,  we have MrT(wS,ws)  >
irt(ws,e) whereas for all ws > r,  we have 4T(ws,wsE)  < 7r(ws,E).
A.2  Proof  of Proposition  1
Suppose the source firm offers a wage ws to its  workers and the host firm
matches that  wage to attract  informed workers.  The marginal cost of the
source firm is cs  =  ws and the marginal cost of the host firm is CH =  OwS.33
Clearly, a higher wage offered by the source firm raises the  costs of both
firms, provided the host firm continues to match the source firm's wage.
To simplify notation,  in what  follows, we denote p-  p(Q), p'-p'(Q)
and p"  p"(Q) and omit the superscripts on qi that  indicate optimal values.
Differentiating the source firm's profit function (1) with respect to ws
=  [p' (@wq  aq)  -P]  qs +  - i  -wsI  (14)
aWS  [Pwy  i9ws)  1~Js  9ws
At the optimum, use the first order conditions (2) to obtain
(97rS  _  ~  1(5
Ow 8 W  = qs [1 
33To be precise, the host firm has to offer a wage e higher than the source firm, but
since  e  is arbitrarily  close  to zero, we  can safely  ignore  it.MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  23
Therefore, p'2  >  1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the source
firm's profits to increase with the wage it pays. Differentiating the first order
conditions (2) gives the following  system
[2p'+qsp"  p  +qsp  8ws  -
p  +  qHp  2 p  +qHP  O  s  - (16)
A
where IAI = p  [,3p  + p" (qH + qs)]  >  0 as p' < 0 and p" < 0.  Using Cramer's
rule,
t9qH  _(2p'  +  8s~'  - (p' + qHP")
t9WS  afl,=(2p+gsP)I0Al  (P+qff  < 0  (17)
since 0 > 1. Using (15) and (17),
-ais  =  P  [(2p' + qsp ") 8-  (P' + qHP)]  1  (18)
O9ws  J  AI1
which simplifies to
:ir9 _  2 (p')2 (8 - 2) +  p"p'  [qs(  - 1) -2H  (19)
where JAI > 0. Sufficient conditions to ensure that  the source firm's profits
increase with  the wage it pays are  0 - 2  >  0 and  qs(O - 1) - 2qq  >  0.
Since qs  >  qH, both  conditions hold when 8 > 3. Furthermore, in the limit
as the host firm's disadvantage disappears 9 -f  1, the source firm's profits
decrease with its wage. By continuity, the source firm's profits must remain
unchanged by an increase in its wage for some threshold Os, with 1 <  Os < 3.
Similarly, differentiating the host firm's profit function (1) with respect
to WS
___  _  [,/'S  +1  +  )  ]  (20)
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At the optimum, use the first order conditions (2) to obtain
IrH =_q  [p, 9qs  1]  (21)
a 9WS  q  0  [WS
Using Cramer's  rule
,9qs  _  (2p +  qHP)  -9  (p' + qsP")  (22)
aws  JAI
Using  (21) and (22)
w  |  f L\2  p  +  "P)  (-'  (23)
which  simplifies to
2~~~
7r_  2(p  )(1_  20)±+pp'(qH(1  -)-  )  (24)
aws  JAI
This inequality is true for all values of 9 (greater than one by assumption)
and follows from the productivity  disadvantage suffered by the  host firm.
Thus, the host firm always enjoys higher profits under technology transfer.
A.3  Proof  of  Lemma  2
First, we show that the SET  curve is downward  sloping in the (0,  w0)  space.
Along the  SET  curve,  r4(W , e3) =  4T(1,  9).  The right  hand  side is increas-
ing in 9 while the left hand  side is unaffected.  Thus,  for the two to  stay
equal, as 9 increases, wE must decrease.
Second, we show that  the SEN  curve intersects the vertical axis above
the SET  curve.  The SEN  curve intersects the vertical axis at e.  Let the
SET curve intersect the vertical axis at some  W0,  the wage where the source
firm is indifferent between exporting and  FDI with no technology transfer
at  0 =  1.  We claim 1 <  i5V  <  E. The logic as follows. Since at  0  =  1,
WN  (r,e)  =  7N(9e,)  <  4(1,1),  it  must  be  that  7rsE(E,e)  <  7r4T(1,1).
Therefore,  since  7rO(ws', 6)  is  decreasing  in  wE,  7rSE(iSE,  )  =  rT(1, 1)  iff
wivE  < e.  Lastly,  1 <  tiv  because  at  w-'  =  1, 7rE'(l, 8)  > 4rT(1,  1).MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  25
Third,  we  show that  the  SEN  curve  and  the  SET  curve  intersect  at
(0,  St)  as well as  at  (E, 1), where  di-  Se.  At  9  =  e,  7(r,)  =
N(1,  )  = irT(1,0).  Further,  at  9 =  e  and wE =  1, we have 7SN(r,e) =
irSE(1,E). Suppose 0  =  Os, by definition  at  0  =  Os, we have  7rs(P,8)  =
4r;(l,9).  Subtracting  7rf(ivE,  )  from both  sides of the equation  implies
that  at 0 = Os, we must have A7rSN(r, e) =  7rSET  (1, 0), so the SEN  and
SET  curves must intersect at 9 = Os
A.4  Proof  of Lemma  3
Differentiating host firm profits with respect to 0
d1H =  (QN)  [90q  +  ]  qH  + [p(Q  )]  (25)
Rearranging and making use of the first order conditions (2), the total effect
of a change in 0 (the host firm's disadvantage) on host firm profits is negative.
chrf 1 =P  9q  <0  (26)
Next consider the effect of a change in 0 on the wage premium paid to workers
dBN  e  N)~  q"  N  N 1 q~ dBN  @ {OqsN  <  0  iq  f (9qs  <qs  27)
dA 8  t  - d~~g  a-o  3  0  _
N+
dBN  _  N8
d9  72 S  1  dS  (28)MULTINATIONAL FIRMS  AND TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  26
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